Coursework is coming to a head, so I'm just going to jot down a quick one.
Sometime last week I encountered a utilitarian objection to John Rawls' difference principle. It is put forward by economist John Harsanyi and goes like this:
Consider a society consisting of two individuals. Both of them have their material needs properly taken care of, but society still has a surplus of resources left over. This surplus can be used either to provide education in higher mathematics for individual A, who has a truly exceptional mathematical ability, and has an all-consuming interest in receiving instruction in higher mathematics. Or it could be used to provide remedial training for B, who is a severely retarded person. Such training could achieve only trivial improvements in B’s condition (he could perhaps learn how to tie his shoelaces) but presumably it would give him some minor satisfaction. Finally, suppose that it is not possible to divide up the surplus resources between the two individuals. The difference principle would require that these resources be spent on B’s remedial training, since he is the less fortunate of the two individuals. In contrast, both utilitarianism and common sense would suggest that they be spent on A.
This scenario is quite absurd, and hence I disagree that it can yield any satisfying conclusion. In a society with only two individuals, I contend that it makes little sense to give surplus resources to one person just on the basis that it would produce greater satisfaction by allowing him to learn something not directly translatable into practical advantages. Why would it matter? Why would the person care about satisfaction that can be gained from learning higher mathematics? What is the point?
In reality, people gain satisfaction for tangible reasons. A person is likely to gain satisfaction from learning higher mathematics because it allows him to further his own interests in the context of living in a complex society. Even if it is purely out of passion, it would be a passion that he seeks to share with other people (who are able to appreciate his abilities) in various ways. I find it difficult to imagine a hermit gaining much satisfaction from learning mathematics while living alone in a cave. While that may be possible, it would be the exception and not the rule.
Hence, there is no reason to hold on to a moral rule that demands that we always choose the option that we perceive as leading to higher satisfaction. Estimates of satisfaction are complex and are likely to have a social dimension. In situations like that which is described above, the choice is not a moral choice but an arbitrary one. Sticking to the utilitarian rule in this context only seems silly and not at all common sense.
In this sense, utilitarianism may be good at giving us directions, but I'm not sure those would lead us anywhere.
I am not to sure about this two person example for a few reason. First, it is not strictly a two person example, for who is to teach the math to this person? An outside individual? In which case, we have left Rawls theory of Justice, which is meant for nation-states, and have entered into his extended theories of international relations. Furthermore, it is not clear to me that mathematical training, which will cost the bulk of the surplus resources in this scenario, will not benefit the other person who is retarded. With the math skill he might be able to make working more efficient, and that might materially benefit the other person in society, providing him not merely utilitarian satisfaction, but more primary goods. And as long as they benefit from the reduction in labor time, by gaining more surplus time, I see no problem. I think that Rawls thinks that incentives given to the most talented is a good idea, but if, and only if, it helps the least advantaged, and one could argue that this could be the case, especially if these two grew out of, or live with an, agreed understanding of basic justice, in which case (because of retardation) we must look to Martha Nussbaum's work, as she is the one who "deals" with those people who would be, potentially if not actually, discluded from Rawls original position for not having the prerequisite normal intelligence necessary for representation. Indeed, if we are strictly dealing with Rawls, then the retarded person is more of a child than an adult moral agent that could be placed in the original position, behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance.
Hi. Thanks for your extensive and thought-provoking comments.
I think we broadly agree that the two-person example is simplistic and cannot yield a satisfying conclusion as to what moral principle should be followed when trying to decide to whom to allocate the surplus resources. It seems that we also agree that calculations of benefit or satisfaction are more complex than that displayed in Harsanyi's account.
You mention Nussbaum, which is interesting, but probably not because we are thinking the same things. Actually, part of what inspired me to write this brief critique is Aristotle's conception of the goal of human life. This also seems to be a source of inspiration for Rawls' idea that human beings have higher aspirations. To me it all seems to converge on the idea of human flourishing. At least that's how I see it.
I bring this up because I'm currently thinking of the role of an Aristotelian conception of morality in a Marxist account of social relations. So I'll probably be writing about Aristotle's ideas again soon.
I look forward to your future writings on Aristotle, and appreciate you thoughtful and rather quick response. As one who studies the Law and Morality, you blog is very refreshing.
PS
No response to his comment necessarily, unless of course you think that it is...