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The Prestige

Posted by moses @ 18:28 • , , , • 0 comments


There's plenty to hate about pop culture. I'm sure all that can be said has been said and is being said again, even by the same people who embrace it daily. Also, I personally don't hate pop culture. I'm fascinated by it to some extent. I think the feeling that it should sometimes inspire is not so much hate (contempt, perhaps, when you're faced with its excesses). Rather, I think the occasional feeling towards it should be fear.

Why be afraid? Well, because of its power and its blindness. And while the weight of its mass is blind, it is controllable and is controlled. On one hand, it expresses the fickleness of public opinion. On the other, it reeks of the real possibility of moulding and pushing that ephemeral opinion one way or another. Moreover, this is done under an appealing visage of individuality and 'culture'.

Take the death of Michael Jackson as an example. Just before it happened, he was a joke, a figure receiving of laughter and contempt in the public consciousness. He was hated for being a likely paedophile, reviled for opting to disfigure himself to change his skin colour and labelled as a has-been. That was the kind of image that the media portrayed.

And then he died. Suddenly, he was a star again. He was remembered as the king of pop, not the has-been that he had just been regarded as. His unsavoury lifestyle and habits were forgotten amidst a worldwide phenomenon of mourning. And that is itself phenomenal. People suddenly acted as if he was a hero, as if he was universally loved for his contributions. But what has he done to merit such an image? Can he really be considered a heroic figure?

So what could explain such a turnaround? What else, if not the fact that people buy readily into hype? And hype is just one face of the manipulation of public opinion that pop culture facilitates and disguises. Behind the phenomena, there are people who want you to think this or that at their whim. One day you're allied with Eurasia and at war with Eastasia; tomorrow, you're suddenly allied with Eastasia and at war with Eurasia – and that is accepted with hardly a blink!

Don't you get a shudder when you think of this? But perhaps you wouldn't, simply because such an incredible leverage is not used for overtly sinister purposes. Why, at most these controlling interests ultimately want you consume this or that, right?

But, once again, that is only one face of the whole machinery, a vast apparatus that is also perpetuating all sorts of problems across the world. And that is because it is an amoral force, a force motivated by objects and concepts that are not even actual objects except by the tacit acknowledgement of people who want them to be. It is an inhuman force.

In this instance, however, the force appears very much human. Pop culture is frequently about celebrating individuality, about expressing yourself. It is called culture. Yet it is one that is mass produced, packaged and marketed to as many people as possible. It celebrates the same 'individual' identities that many celebrate, and also that certain people want you to celebrate. It appears as some sort of social consciousness, but it is one that is very much controlled by large profit-oriented private interests. Clearly, it is paradoxical and absurd.

I guess the fear really lies in the thought that this might be both the present and the future, the idea that we could be watching an unending show that sickens us. And that is because society is unable to break free from the mechanisms behind the phenomena. We watch, engrossed for a while, but as soon as we care to look into it, we realise the trick. And with horror we witness how it captures the audience again and again.

Perhaps they want to believe what they are seeing.

Are you watching closely?


Santayana Night

Posted by moses @ 09:38 • , , • 0 comments


It's new year's eve again, and I feel no compunction to join the merry-makers out there. As it would often seem to me, New Year's Day is just another day. Why would I suffer the vicissitudes of a crowded night in anticipation of it?

This year, though, I do feel that the coming of the year has some sort of significance—perhaps as a celebration of the passing of days past and of hope for the future?

Well, you're likely to reap what you've sowed for the past year or even earlier, so you shouldn't be too surprised at what's coming. And wishing for luck is meaningless. I just don't like the vague idea of hope, without a good reason behind it, as it soon translates disappointment—as many will find out once again.

Maybe, for this year, the fact that the new millennium is entering into its teens is a fact worth celebrating? After all, when will you see a 9-year-old millennium turn 10 again? But, the interesting idea aside, does that really make a difference?

It seems hard to find much significance when the coming of the year does not by itself bring about change. But I think I found a good and simple answer.

Ultimately, the greatest meaning that could be ascribed to the occasion lies not so much in looking towards the new year as in looking at the passing one. And it's not to look at the past for some sort validation for present decisions on the future, but to look at past mistakes and to learn from them.

I think that's what new year resolutions amount to if they're any good at all—you tell yourself not to repeat the mistakes of the past year (or years). That's much more concrete and meaningful than having a vague and ephemeral hope for the coming year, or a determination to do a random assortment of things that you don't have much reason to believe you would end up doing. It gives a genuine reason to be hopeful.

And with that in mind, I hope you have a happy new year.

He who controls the past...

Posted by moses @ 23:14 • , , , • 0 comments


I just remembered an article I read a few months ago that talks about how and why Singaporeans are forward-looking and orientated towards the future.

Basically, the article says that because Singapore does not really have a glorious founding history to look back to (its independence was viewed with a sense of disaster and failure – i.e. failure to unify with Malaysia), Singaporeans are forced to forge a sense of national identity that is always focused on future possibilities for the nation.

Quite the bon mot there. Unfortunately, just as the article talks about myth-making, this is itself a myth.

Singapore is forward-looking inasmuch as policy makers and government planners make plans (or try to) for the future. But how many people are involved in making such decisions? Many Singaporeans don't even get to vote on who should represent them.

The truth is Singaporeans are always justifying their choices with reference to the past. How many times have we both heard and argued that we can be sure the current government or system is the right one because of its track record? Even the article suggests the same notion: Look at what we've built – surely that means we're making the right choices?

Even discounting the fact that the article itself argues for the unreality of the time present as such (to Singaporeans, it is merely "an incidental passage towards time future"), it is a mistake to be too focused on the successful present. Present success has little bearing on present decisions. It can only validate past decisions. The economic accomplishments of Singapore are not due to decisions made today or even yesterday, but decisions made as far back as decades ago.

The rationale that you make certain decisions today because similar decisions made in the past have proven to yield good results today is not self-sufficient logic – it is not necessarily the best way to make decisions. Since the consequences of today's decisions lie in the future and are unverifiable, we cannot simply make judgements based on the empirically verifiable. We also need to question the reason behind our decisions today, keeping in mind that the present is different from the past.

It is a matter of fact that Singaporeans persist in following the ways of the past because those worked. They don't find it necessary or urgent to question such assumptions in light of the fact that 2009 is very different from 1969, to consider that maybe it's time to change their political outlook for the future of the country. Moreover, there is a perpetual wealth of self-congratulatory messages, while criticisms tend to either be confined to the trivial or dismissed as dismissive of the achievements of the nation thus far.

If the article can say that every National Day Singaporeans come together to look towards the future of the nation, we can equally say that every Election Day they come together to put their confidence in the past.

I wonder which is more significant.


An expensive naiveté

Posted by moses @ 18:57 • , • 0 comments



I read with some amusement a student-written editorial in a campus newspaper. It deals with the issue of cutting bankers' bonuses, and its conclusion is that we shouldn't because we will lose out if we do. It makes me wonder if it's not the case that at least one of the writers is an aspiring banker.

I call into question the article's portrayal of a symbiotic relationship between bankers and society. Yes, they generate income, provide capital that ultimately creates jobs and etc. But this is a bit like saying you need your abusive husband because he earns money. Sometimes, you have to weigh whether the abuse you get is better than being independent, though no doubt the latter will be hard.

I say this because of two fundamental problems with bankers and their performance. First, there is no balance between risk and reward. Everybody wins when the times are good, especially bankers, with their large bonuses. However, when things take a turn for the worse because of the latter's decisions, society is left to foot the bill. Sure, plenty of bankers lost their jobs, but that's after they have profited massively from the bubbles they created. Besides, many others who were not in the driver's seat of crisis creation also lost their jobs. Is it surprising that people are angry, especially when the bankers want to keep their bonuses despite all this?

And aren't the trillions that taxpayers have spent to bailout the banks a good enough demonstration of a lopsided relationship? Privatising the gains and socialising the losses – that's a good description of current practice.

Second, bankers' performance is overrated. The article says that bonuses "should be directly linked to a bankers’ long-term performance and should not reward reckless risk taking". But the point is that's not how they work. Bankers are rewarded for the right results regardless of whether they did it right. They get the money as soon as they show that they are turning a profit. The large bonuses are not given only after they can show many years of consistent results, the ultimate proof of good performance. That wouldn't be something the bankers want either, and hence they would also quit. Thus, the article's call for not cutting bankers’ bonuses can only mean one thing, and that is the continuation of a broken system.

The conclusion that I draw is therefore very different: We should cut their bonuses until the bankers have something to show for them. Otherwise, all we are doing is incentivising bad behaviour. It might be hard to cut a hand off, but we should if it turns out to be gangrenous.

Utilitarianism as common sense

Posted by moses @ 22:27 • , , • 3 comments


Coursework is coming to a head, so I'm just going to jot down a quick one.

Sometime last week I encountered a utilitarian objection to John Rawls' difference principle. It is put forward by economist John Harsanyi and goes like this:
Consider a society consisting of two individuals. Both of them have their material needs properly taken care of, but society still has a surplus of resources left over. This surplus can be used either to provide education in higher mathematics for individual A, who has a truly exceptional mathematical ability, and has an all-consuming interest in receiving instruction in higher mathematics. Or it could be used to provide remedial training for B, who is a severely retarded person. Such training could achieve only trivial improvements in B’s condition (he could perhaps learn how to tie his shoelaces) but presumably it would give him some minor satisfaction. Finally, suppose that it is not possible to divide up the surplus resources between the two individuals. The difference principle would require that these resources be spent on B’s remedial training, since he is the less fortunate of the two individuals. In contrast, both utilitarianism and common sense would suggest that they be spent on A.
This scenario is quite absurd, and hence I disagree that it can yield any satisfying conclusion. In a society with only two individuals, I contend that it makes little sense to give surplus resources to one person just on the basis that it would produce greater satisfaction by allowing him to learn something not directly translatable into practical advantages. Why would it matter? Why would the person care about satisfaction that can be gained from learning higher mathematics? What is the point?

In reality, people gain satisfaction for tangible reasons. A person is likely to gain satisfaction from learning higher mathematics because it allows him to further his own interests in the context of living in a complex society. Even if it is purely out of passion, it would be a passion that he seeks to share with other people (who are able to appreciate his abilities) in various ways. I find it difficult to imagine a hermit gaining much satisfaction from learning mathematics while living alone in a cave. While that may be possible, it would be the exception and not the rule.

Hence, there is no reason to hold on to a moral rule that demands that we always choose the option that we perceive as leading to higher satisfaction. Estimates of satisfaction are complex and are likely to have a social dimension. In situations like that which is described above, the choice is not a moral choice but an arbitrary one. Sticking to the utilitarian rule in this context only seems silly and not at all common sense.

In this sense, utilitarianism may be good at giving us directions, but I'm not sure those would lead us anywhere.

God is dead, but we do not know it

Posted by moses @ 10:12 • , , , , , , • 0 comments


A while ago I talked about my scepticism towards concepts like Corporate Social Responsibility. While it's not nowadays considered nice or constructive to be dismissive of such things – we are dismissing all the good that do exist in the world, they would say – I think I gave a good enough explanation of why those are inherently absurd. But allow me to elaborate on it, with a view to what we can do.

What I'm going to say might not sound new here, but I hope it's a coherent synthesis of the ideas I have expressed, delivered concisely at a particular angle of social commentary.

A few centuries ago, it might have been feasible to appeal to a traditional regard for virtues or a sense of honour and responsibility in the powerful – noblesse oblige, the responsibility of those who have. That was a world of stratified social relations based on feudal or patriarchal links. There were strong forces of tradition that prescribe relationships between a someone of higher rank and someone of lower rank, relationships generally involving responsibility and even compassion on one side and loyalty on the other. Appeals to the ideas associated with such traditions would thus make perfect sense.

Now, I'm not looking at history with nostalgic glasses. Of course, there were plenty of inherent injustices in the old stratified societies. What I'm trying to point out is the anachronism of a method with respect to the times.

The rise of the classical liberals has destroyed the old forms of society. Social relations are no longer to be forged out of customs and slavish adherence to associated ideas. Rather, as Adam Smith suggested, they are to consist of mutual relations of self-interest. This is the bourgeois revolution. Fetters of tradition and its morality were to be removed to allow all men (and eventually women) to advance their own interests to a potentially unlimited extent. The rule of law is to be established to keep things in order, but no longer are people bound by prescribed roles and responsibilities.

The only duty one owes is to the state, the embodiment of the social contract. But the rhetoric of loyalty and virtue that is still frequently used sits uncomfortably with the new direction of political philosophy. Strictly speaking, we have a duty to the state not because of some traditional moral concept or other, but because we are bound by the common interest in a stable society.

This arrangement sounds fine and well. However, the role of the state is still a grey area. We know why the state is there, but is the existence of a raison d'être enough?

In practice, the state needs to perpetually affirm its purpose and existence through its acts, which interfere even with our daily lives. A state that does not act is a state that no one has faith in; it is naturally one that will subsequently cease to exist. Some people might wish to say otherwise, but reality attests to the fact that the only viable states are states that act. And so what the state ends up doing is a matter of concern, and with it comes the question of its role and responsibilities.

The problem, as in the case of other legal entities such as corporations, is with the fact that the state is not a person. The state is a machine consisting of multitudes of individuals and bureaucratic apparatuses with non-human systemic considerations, likely controlled by certain interests that are themselves collective groups. The state has legally-defined responsibilities, but an appeal to its sense of responsibility or to its moral sense is useless. What you might expect to move a monarch or a lord is not likely to move a modern state with highly distributed powers, especially since it is constructed from relations of mutual self-interest.

As such, appealing to morality – that might work on some individuals within the system, but it would be absurd to expect it to move the system as a whole. Chances are, that way, we will be hung out to dry waiting for our concerns to be addressed satisfactorily.

If we assume a system that is somewhat just, as Rawls does, relying on the state's legally-defined responsibilities would be enough. But I fail to see how a state that is, in reality, perpetually in the stranglehold of particular interests would ever realistically be just enough. We only need to look at the state of the world to confirm this: How many people remain hungry, poor and oppressed just because certain interests have to be kept satisfied, even in liberal democracies (keeping in mind, of course, the effect one nation has on another)?

And, if what I have said so far is correct, the satisfaction of the concerns of those who are unjustly treated cannot be achieved merely by appealing to old concepts and traditions of morality. In a society built on mutual self-interest, you are pretty much responsible for advancing your own interests. This is why those who are oppressed must organise themselves as a force to fight for their interests.

But should they act only within legally-defined limits?

I believe that they cannot always do so. Ideally, we would want obey the law to preserve stability in the society for everyone's benefit. However, the resources at the disposal of the powerful make attempts to effect change through the prescribed channels very difficult. The playing field is far from level. Thus, it is unreasonable to expect us to only exercise our political freedom by voting in elections and appealing to our political representatives. We need other avenues, the most drastic of which is revolution. This is the practical argument for extra-legality. And since the same argument applies to the constitution, which is not necessarily just, extra-legality really amounts to extra-constitutionality.

Now, I do believe that the virtues are not completely lost. Otherwise, I could easily be construed as envisioning a world moved entirely by the force of might. However, in order to be able to appeal to them effectively, we have to take people out of their modern (liberal) institutional contexts. We have to appeal to human beings, the timeless individuals, not to citizens, soldiers or politicians. And this is the essence of the moral argument for extra-constitutionality – we do not adhere merely to the laws, but also to common moral concepts that hopefully have not died out. The moral appeal would strengthen the movement. However, before the movement can speak on such a level, it has to be able to operate on a level beyond the constitutional (i.e. in keeping with the practical argument). Otherwise, it would be trapped by the legal realist loop that smothers moral thinking.

In effect, what I espouse is a belief in the freedom to fight. Neo-liberals and free marketeers believe in free competition. But, as much as they might want to deny it, they are stuck within their own rigid systems. To be truly for liberty, we cannot advocate only a free market for products. We must advocate, above all, a free market for ideas and the political actions of individuals.

Conflict of interest is a circumstance of justice, and the lack of a viable conflict of interest in real life is an indication that something is wrong. A political system where we can only vote for parties with few differences between them is recipe for perpetual injustice. We must bring back other avenues of pressing for our interests, even if they are illegal. And we must appeal to human beings outside of the control of the modern state to fight in the name of what is good and just. This is the vision of justice as struggle and dialectics.

It is what it takes to strive for justice in the kind of society we live in.


Big faith, small minds

Posted by moses @ 09:58 • , , , , • 0 comments


A week or two ago, the blog of someone I know received an unexpected comment. Some unknown dude (I shall presume it's a guy, since he sounds like one) seemed to have found the blog and commented, on the entry that talks about moving away from home for the year, that the author sucks and must be "a closet gay".

Well, I don't see what could justify such a comment to begin with. Is any personal reflection a sign of someone being a closet gay?

Another funny thing is the idiot seemed to have done this at work, without being aware that his IP address could be traced to his office. And apparently he works for Firebrand Interactive Ltd at North Bridge Road. Sounds like a pretty regular office worker.

So we can tentatively establish that some Singaporean office workers are juvenile. But the fact that he used the word "gay" in a derogatory manner also indicates that he is intolerant towards a sexuality that is different from his own. And I guess it would not be news to anyone who knows Singapore to say that many Singaporeans are intolerant in the homophobic sense.

Personally, I have little tolerance for the intolerant, but I like how John Rawls puts it: In the absence of a real threat to liberty, we should tolerate the intolerant because we shouldn't act unjustly just because others act unjustly. Moreover, a society that tolerates people who have no title to complain about intolerance towards them (because they preach intolerance themselves) might have a civilising influence on them over time.

In other words, we don't try to outlaw them like they try to outlaw others because we're civilised people, unlike them.

But I'm a Marxist, so I do believe that we should fight back. And we can do so by aggressively questioning the rationale of their political crusade. I'm confident that there is no way institutionalised homophobia is defensible in a modern and secular country. Who said it is immoral and why? Why is it unnatural? The clothes you wear are unnatural – do you propose having them banned for being unnatural? These are just basic questions that I've never heard a homophobe give satisfactory answers to.

And, even under the purview of freedom of speech, there are reasonable limits. Freedom of speech is not an excuse, for one, to have someone in a public position run away with her mouth. Leadership is, after all, supposed to carry responsibility, right? What would happen if public leaders started talking about their reservations regarding certain ethnic groups? What effect would that have on the society?

But I've written on this before, so besides the few points that I've raised here, I would like to leave the intolerant with something they do deserve – ridicule.

I bet they haven't spent much time thinking about what they believe. Maybe only prayed hard about it.